Consumer Bankruptcy

Chapter 13 Plan Must Pay Adequate Protection Payments Prior to Attorneys Fees

By: Brian Lacoff

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In a decision of importance to Chapter 13 debtors’ attorneys, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of New Jersey ruled that an undersecured creditor, Ford Motor Credit Co., was entitled not only to adequate protection payments, but that the section 507(b)

[1]

“super-priority” status of the inadequate adequate protection provided during the case meant that the Chapter 13 plan had to pay those amounts before paying any of the debtor’s attorneys fees.

[2]

Ford Motor Credit objected to the debtor’s Chapter 13 plan for failure to provide adequate protection payments, violating 11 U.S.C. §§ 361, 1325 and 1326.

[3]

  The debtor modified the plan to include adequate protection payments, but objected to the creditor’s contention that those payments had super-priority over debtor’s attorney fees.

[4]

  The court agreed with Ford Motor Credit, reasoning that the creditor, having a lien on the debtor’s property, must be afforded protection against the daily depreciation of its property.

[5]

Technical Defects in Proof of Claim Not Grounds for Disallowance

By: Robert Ryan

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

Firmly adopting the “exclusive” view of claim objections, the Tenth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in B-Line, LLC v. Kirkland

[1]

held that a claim could not be disallowed under 11 U.S.C. § 502

[2]

for failure to submit supporting documentation with a proof of claim since that is not one of the grounds expressly stated in the statute.

[3]

  Although Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3001 requires that supporting documentation be provided with a proof of claim,

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neither the Rule nor the statute clearly states what to do if a creditor fails to submit supporting documentation.

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 The court held that section 502(b) provided an exclusive list of reasons why a claim should be dismissed, reasoning that the “shall allow … except” command in section 502(b) and the absence of an expansive term like “including” indicated that the list was exclusive.

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  Since the Rules cannot modify substantive rights, technical defects in the proof of claim are not grounds for objection.

[7]

 

Ride Through Option for Real Property Survived BAPCPA

By: James Lynch

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

Although the Bankruptcy Abuse Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) largely eliminated the so-called “ride through” option for security interests in personal property, the Connecticut Bankruptcy Court in In re Caraballo

[1]

held that the option remains available for liens secured by real estate.  Under the ride through, a debtor whose real estate mortgage is not in default does not have to reaffirm the debt or surrender the real estate, but can retain the real estate by continuing to make the scheduled mortgage payments.

[2]

  Thus, since the debtor in Caraballo was not in default, the Court disapproved the debtor’s mortgage reaffirmation agreement as not being in her best interests “because she could retain the subject real property without reaffirming the [d]ebt.”

[3]

 

Applying the Applicable Standard or the Actual Amount Monthly Rent in a Debtors Chapter 13 Plan

By: Paola Chiarenza

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

Although the “means test” added by the 2005 BAPCPA amendments

[1]

was designed to ensure that chapter 13 debtors repay creditors as much as they can afford, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York followed a plain language approach to hold that in determining a debtor’s disposable income the proper deduction is the full amount of the rental allowance set forth in the objective IRS Standards, even though the actual rental expense is lower.

[2]

  After surveying numerous approaches to addressing the section 1325 (b)(3) and section 707 (b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) directives regarding disposable income, the Court noted that there is “no clear consensus” as to whether the IRS Standard or a lower actual amount applies.

[3]

Lien Preservation Does Not Give Trustee Right To Collect Debt

By: Elizabeth Filardi

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In Morris v. St. John National Bank,

[1]

the Tenth Circuit concluded that a bankruptcy trustee who successfully avoids a lien under the Bankruptcy Code does not automatically assume all the rights the original lienholder may have against the debtor.

[2]

Here, the debtors borrowed $3,050 from the bank, using their 1980 Pontiac Trans Am as security.

[3]

 On the date the debtors filed for bankruptcy, they still owed the bank $3,237.50 on the loan, but the fair market value of the car was only $2,000.

[4]

  The Trustee successfully avoided the bank’s lien on the car.  While §551 preserved the lien for the benefit of the estate,

[5]

the issue was whether bankruptcy law permitted the trustee to recover the full amount owed or whether the trustee was limited to the value of the bank’s security interest in the car itself.

[6]

  The Tenth Circuit concluded that a trustee who avoids a lien pursuant to 11 U.S.C §544 and preserves it under §551 is limited to the value of the lien and does not acquire the bank’s right to collect any debt amount beyond the value of the security interest.

[7]

Consequently, the trustee’s recovery was limited to the $2,000 value of the secured interest on the debtor’s car and could not recoup the full $3,237.50 value owed on the loan at the time of the bankruptcy filing. 

IRS Setoff Rights Not Limited to Priority Taxes

By: Robert Griswold

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In U.S. v. White,

[1]

a debtor owed $8,922.40 to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), $1,780.52 of which was considered priority debt.

[2]

  The debtor filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy in February of 2004 and claimed as exempt a $3,148 tax overpayment for the 2003 tax year.

[3]

  The IRS moved to lift the automatic stay in order to allow it to setoff the entire 2003 overpayment against its pre-petition tax claim.

[4]

  In the decision appealed from, the Pennsylvania bankruptcy court allowed the IRS to setoff only to the extent of the priority debt, requiring the remainder of the overpayment to be returned to the debtor as a tax refund.

[5]

  The district court reversed, holding that the IRS could setoff the entire 2003 overpayment.

[6]

  The court acknowledged a split of authority regarding whether the IRS’ right to setoff non-priority debt is allowed against exempt assets of the debtor or whether its right to setoff is limited to priority claims,

[7]

but found the reasoning behind the cases allowing setoff of the overpayment against entire pre-petition claim more compelling.

[8]

Achieving Aims of Bankruptcy by Allowing Direct Payments under Chapter 13

By: Renton Persaud

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In a decision of importance to chapter 13 debtors, the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in In Re Lopez

[1]

held that chapter 13 debtors are permitted to pay post-petition mortgage payments directly to creditors outside of the plan even though the plan cures and reinstates the mortgage.  According to the court, the new provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”) do not change the law with respect to such direct payments.

[2]

  The court drew a distinction between claims “impaired” by the debtor’s plan, which must be made through the chapter 13 trustee, and unimpaired claims, which need not be.

[3]

 The court bifurcated the mortgage debt between the cure payments and the regularly scheduled payments accruing post-petition.  Under the court’s view, only the cure amount was impaired and must be paid through the plan.

[4]

  The importance of the decision to debtors is that it avoids the chapter 13 trustee’s fee on the regular mortgage payment, an amount that was $308 per month in this case.

[5]

  Of special interest in light of the currently pending legislation that could permit modification of home mortgages in chapter 13, the court distinguishes Fulkrod v. Barmettler (In re Fulkrod)

[6]

and indicated that, where the mortgage is reamortized, as in chapter 12 cases, the payments must be made through the plan.

[7]

 

Can Software Be a Bankruptcy Petition Preparer

By: Thomas Szaniawski

St. John's Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In a case of first impression that addressed the intersection of cyberspace and bankruptcy, the Ninth Circuit, in Reynoso v. United States (In re Reynoso),

[1]

held that a provider of web-based bankruptcy software was a bankruptcy petition preparer (“BPP”)

[2]

under 11 U.S.C. section 110(a)(1),

[3]

and that, under California law, the features of the petition preparing software went beyond mere typesetting and constituted the unauthorized practice of law.

[4]