Mortgagees Misapplication of Plan Payments Not Tortious

By: Benjamin Yeamans

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
 
 
In In re Oliver, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas held that a debtor did not meet the threshold requirements to proceed on a claim of outrage (i.e., intentional infliction of emotional distress)[1] by alleging that a creditor had misapplied payments received from the debtor and the trustee in violation of the debtor’s chapter 13 plan.[2] Mr. and Mrs. Oliver (the “Debtors”) entered into a loan agreement with CitiCorp Trust Bank FSB (the “Creditor”) to finance the purchase of their home.[3] Roughly three years later, the Debtors filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.[4] The Debtors’ confirmed chapter 13 plan stipulated that the Creditor must apply any mortgage payments to the mortgage balance immediately upon receipt as opposed to holding the payments in a suspense account.[5] The plan also required the Creditor to apply payments made by the chapter 13 trustee and the Debtors to pre-petition arrearages and post-petition claims respectively.[6] The Debtors alleged that the creditor violated the terms of its chapter 13 plan by holding partial mortgage payments in suspense accounts, which resulted in improper interest calculations.[7] Additionally, the Debtors alleged that the Creditor had also violated the plan by failing to provide complete and accurate accountings of payment received from the Debtor and the chapter 13 trustee.[8] Finally, the Debtors also claimed that the Creditor’s misapplication of payments caused the Debtors to file incorrect tax returns, and that as a result, they were denied credit or offered credit at a higher rate.[9]
 
The bankruptcy court determined that the Creditor’s conduct did not go “beyond the bounds of decency” and therefore, the Debtor’s outrage claim was insufficient to survive the Creditor’s motion to dismiss on summary judgment.[10] The court noted two threshold requirements for an outrage claim, including, that the Defendant’s conduct be so extreme and outrageous that recovery is required.[11] Conduct associated with successful outrage claims must go “beyond the bounds of decency and [is] to be regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable.”[12] The court contrasted the Creditor’s actions with cases where successful outrage claims were made, including where a creditor harassed a debtor over the phone and threatened to harm the debtor and his family with financial destruction and physical harm if the debt was not paid.[13] In contrast, the court found that the Creditor’s conduct in this case did not go “beyond the bounds of decency” nor was it “atrocious and utterly intolerable,” because the alleged conduct here was simply not as outrageous when compared to cases involving successful claims.[14] Although the court admitted that no clear line defines outrageous conduct, the court found that “this case is clearly insufficient to reach even the blurred edges of that line.”[15
 
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas joins a number of other courts that have dismissed claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress as a matter of law, when creditors misapply payments from the provisions of an approved chapter 13 plan.[16] Such courts have emphasized that a cognizable claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is difficult to establish and have demonstrated their willingness to dismiss claims that are not predicated on truly egregious conduct. However, debtors have other statutory remedies available,[17] and creditors should not take their obligations under chapter 13 plans lightly. Courts have sanctioned creditors for misapplying payments in violation of their obligations[18] and have awarded punitive damages when appropriate.[19] Although punitive damages for creditors can result in substantial fines,[20] creditors misapplying plan payments need not fear unpredictable tort liability for claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress.


[1] Valadez v. Emmis Communications, 290 Kan. 472, 476 (2010) (equating outrage with intentional infliction of emotional distress).
[2] In re Oliver, Bankr, No. 05-40504, 2012 WL 1252955, at *1 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 13, 2012).
[3] Id. (CitiCorp Trust Bank FSB is a part of CitiGroup, Inc.).
[4] Id.
[5] Id. (a suspense account is a temporary account in which entries of credits are made until their proper disposition can be determined).
[6] Id.
[7] Id. (by keeping the payments in the suspense account without crediting the mortgage, the Olivers were required to pay a greater amount of interest on the mortgage than if Citi had credited the mortgage immediately).
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at *2.
[10] Id. at *4.
[11] Id. at *3 (the second threshold that must be met is that the emotional distress suffered is so extreme that the law must intervene. However, the court did not need to consider whether this threshold was met, since the debtors did not meet the first threshold); See Hanrahan v. Horn, 232 Kan. 531, 537 (1983) (finding it is unnecessary to address the second threshold requirement concerning the severity of the emotional distress if the first requirement concerning the nature of the conduct is not met).
[12] In re Oliver, 2012 WL 1252955, at *3 (citing Miller v. Sloan, Listrom, Eisenbarth, Sloan and Glassman, 267 Kan. 245, 257 (1999)). 
[13] Id. at *4 (citing Dawson v. Associates Fin. Services Co., 215 Kan. 814 (1974); See also Smith v. Welch 265 Kan. 868 (1998) (asking inappropriate questions about patient’s sexual history and making inappropriate sexual contact with patient gave rise to a claim for outrage).
[14] Id. at *4.
[15] Id.
[16] See Huber v. Trans Union, LLC, No. 4:11-cv-139-SEB-DML, 2012 WL 3045686, at *4 (D. Ind. Jul. 25, 2012); see also In re Newcomber, 416 B.R. 166 , 183–84 (Bankr. D. Md. 2009); In re Mattox, Bankr, No. 07-51925, 2011 WL 3626762, at *12 (Bankr. D. Ky. Aug. 17, 2011) (court dismissed plaintiffs claim when Wells Fargo charged improper fees and attempted to foreclose on property). 
[17] 11 U.S.C. § 524(i) (2006) (providing a remedy if a creditor willfully fails to properly credit payments under a confirmed plan). See In re Hardy, 97 F.3d 1384, 1389 (1996) (based on the inherent contempt power of the court under 11 U.S.C. § 105, a court can award actual damages for a violation of 11 U.S.C. § 524).
[18] See In re Jones, Bankr, No. 03-16518, 2007 WL 2480494, at *8, (Bankr. D. La. Aug. 29, 2007).
[19] See 11 U.S.C. § 362(k)(1) (2006) (providing a remedy of actual damages including costs and attorney’s fees and in appropriate circumstances, punitive damages for willful violation of automatic stay); see In re Jones, Bankr, No. 03-16518, 2012 WL 1155715, at *10, (Bankr. D. La. Apr. 5, 2012) (applying section § 362(k)(1), awarded debtor punitive damages when creditor misapplied payments from chapter 13 plan).  
[20] See In re Jones, 2012 WL 1155715, at *10 (awarding $3,171,154.00 in punitive damages to debtor, against creditor, Wells Fargo); see generally In re McCormack, 203 B.R. 521 (Bankr. D. N.H. 2009).