Bankruptcy Litigation

Definition of Reasonably Equivalent Value Narrowed as Pool of Potential Litigants is Expanded in Fraudulent Transfer Context

By: Steve Traditi

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In In re TOUSA, Inc.,[1] the Eleventh Circuit held that subsidiaries of a parent company did not receive “reasonably equivalent value” in exchange for liens granted to secure the obligations of the parent company in an attempt by the group to avoid bankruptcy.[2] The court also held that third party beneficiaries could be liable as parties “for whose benefit” the transfer was made.[3] In 2005, TOUSA, Inc., a large homebuilding company, entered into a joint venture in order to acquire homebuilding assets from Transeastern Properties, Inc., using monies borrowed from the so-called “Transeastern Lenders” to fund the acquisition.[4] When the housing market took a downturn in 2006, TOUSA defaulted and the Transeastern Lenders sued for more than $2 billion.[5] TOUSA agreed to settle the case for $421 million with money borrowed from a collection of lenders (the “New Lenders”). The New Lenders secured their loans by taking liens on the assets of certain of TOUSA’s subsidiaries (the “Conveying Subsidiaries”).[6]  After TOUSA and its subsidiaries, including the Conveying Subsidiaries, went into bankruptcy, TOUSA sought to avoid the New Lenders’ liens as fraudulent transfers arguing that the Conveying Subsidiaries did not receive reasonably equivalent value.[7] In addition, TOUSA sought to recover from the Transeastern Lenders by claiming that the Transeastern Lenders were the entities for whose benefit the transfer was made.[8]  The bankruptcy court agreed with TOUSA, but the district court reversed.[9] TOUSA then appealed to the Eleventh Circuit.

Mortgagees Misapplication of Plan Payments Not Tortious

By: Benjamin Yeamans

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
 
 
In In re Oliver, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Kansas held that a debtor did not meet the threshold requirements to proceed on a claim of outrage (i.e., intentional infliction of emotional distress)[1] by alleging that a creditor had misapplied payments received from the debtor and the trustee in violation of the debtor’s chapter 13 plan.[2] Mr. and Mrs. Oliver (the “Debtors”) entered into a loan agreement with CitiCorp Trust Bank FSB (the “Creditor”) to finance the purchase of their home.[3] Roughly three years later, the Debtors filed a chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.[4] The Debtors’ confirmed chapter 13 plan stipulated that the Creditor must apply any mortgage payments to the mortgage balance immediately upon receipt as opposed to holding the payments in a suspense account.[5] The plan also required the Creditor to apply payments made by the chapter 13 trustee and the Debtors to pre-petition arrearages and post-petition claims respectively.[6] The Debtors alleged that the creditor violated the terms of its chapter 13 plan by holding partial mortgage payments in suspense accounts, which resulted in improper interest calculations.[7] Additionally, the Debtors alleged that the Creditor had also violated the plan by failing to provide complete and accurate accountings of payment received from the Debtor and the chapter 13 trustee.[8] Finally, the Debtors also claimed that the Creditor’s misapplication of payments caused the Debtors to file incorrect tax returns, and that as a result, they were denied credit or offered credit at a higher rate.[9]

Questions of Fact and Faith Tithing Undue Hardship and Student Loan Discharge

By: Jessica Wright

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In In re Lovell,[1] the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Iowa, held that a debtor who tithed approximately 11% of her gross income was nevertheless entitled to a hearing on whether she qualified for a hardship discharge of her student loan debt.[2] The debtor received a Chapter 7 discharge and then filed an adversary complaint for a discharge of her student loans, arguing that the loans would impose an undue hardship based on her current income and monthly expenses.[3] The debtor was gainfully employed and earned $44,255.04 per year,[4] and in her self-reported monthly expenses[5], she included charitable donations and tithes to her church amounting to nearly 11% of her gross income.[6] In assessing her expenditures, the court held that making charitable contributions and tithing is not per se unreasonable when requesting discharge of student loan debt. Instead, a fact-intensive inquiry into the appropriateness of such expenditures is required. For this reason, the court held that it was precluded from granting summary judgment to the creditor.[7]

Civil Contempt Against Debtor Not Stayed by Bankruptcy Petition

By: Colleen E. Spain

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
 
 
Weighing in on a three-way circuit court split, the Sixth Circuit recognized a non-statutory exception to the automatic stay, in Dominic’s Restaurant of Dayton, Inc. v. Mantia, and allowed a civil contempt proceeding to continue against a debtor.[1] In 2007, the Mantia family closed their family-run restaurant, Dominic’s, but continued to market certain food products under the name “Dominic’s Foods of Dayton.”[2] Soon after the restaurant closed, Christie Mantia sold her interest in the original Dominic’s Restaurant and planned with Reece Powers and Harry Lee to open a restaurant, name it Dominic’s Restaurant, Inc., and use the old Dominic’s recipes.[3] The owners of the original Dominic’s Restaurant (“Plaintiffs”) brought trademark infringement and trademark dilution claims against Mantia, Powers, and Lee (“Defendants”).[4] The district court issued a TRO and then a preliminary injunction (the “Injunctions”) directing Defendants to cease using the Dominic’s name and graphics.[5] After Plaintiffs filed a series of contempt motions against Defendants based on Defendants’ violation of the Injunctions, the district court granted a default judgment and the contempt motion against Defendants.[6] Although Powers filed for personal bankruptcy in the midst of this, the district court declined to stay the judgments against him.[7]

Third Circuit Phases Out Old Standard For Determining When Claims Arise With Some Exceptions

By: Melanie Spergel

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff
 
 
In an interesting twist, the Third Circuit in Wright v. Owens Corning[1] held that the Court’s change in its interpretation of what constitutes a claim meant that the notice given to parties who held claims under the revised interpretation but not under the one applicable at the time of notice would deprive those claimants of due process; therefore their claims were not dischargeable.[2] The debtor, Owens Corning, manufactured the allegedly defective roofing shingles that were installed on the two plaintiffs’ homes.[3]  The debtor twice published notice in several local and national newspapers in an attempt to reach unknown holders of claims against the estate.[4] The debtor’s confirmed chapter 11 reorganization plan (“the Plan”) purported to extinguish all claims that arose prior to the confirmation date, including claims held by parties who only received publication notice.[5] Several years later, the plaintiffs discovered cracks in their roofing shingles, which one plaintiff had installed pre-petition and the other had installed post-petition but pre-confirmation.[6] The plaintiffs sued the reorganized debtor, and claimed that the Plan could not have discharged their claims because the plaintiffs were not claim holders at the time notice of Plan confirmation was published.[7] As such, the plaintiffs claimed that they had not received constitutionally adequate notice.[8]  The Third Circuit agreed that the plaintiffs were deprived of due process but recognized that the deprivation was a result of the Third Circuit’s change in standards for when a claim arises.[9]

Section 108 Relief Automatically Available to Foreign Representatives in Chapter 15 Cases

By: Andrew J. Zapata

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

 

In a matter of first impression, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”) in In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.[1] held that the tolling provisions of section 108 of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) become automatically available to “Foreign Representatives”[2] under section 103(a) in chapter 15 cases.[3]  Fairfield Sentry Ltd. was a feeder fund that invested its assets with Bernard Madoff, and was placed into liquidation proceedings in the British Virgin Islands after Mr. Madoff’s fraudulent activities were uncovered.[4] The Bankruptcy Court recognized the British Virgin Islands proceedings as a foreign main proceeding on July 22, 2010, and held that the joint liquidators were the foreign representatives of the debtor.[5] The foreign representatives sought to have the section 108 tolling provision applied from July 22, 2010 in order to have at least an additional two years to investigate and commence actions.

Non-Collusive Mortgage Foreclosure Held Preferential

 By: Adam S. Cohen

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In In re Whittle Development, Inc.,[1] the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Texas held that a pre-petition foreclosure action against real property may be avoidable as a preferential transfer where the foreclosing creditor receives more than it would have in a liquidation under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, even though the action was non-collusive and complied with state law.[2] Whittle Development, Inc. (the “Debtor”) and Colonial Bank, N.A. (the “Creditor”) entered into a Development Loan Agreement on December 31, 2007 pursuant to which the Creditor loaned the Debtor $2,700,000 (the “Loan”).[3] The Creditor declared a default on the Loan, accelerated the balance due, and on September 7, 2010, foreclosed on the property that secured the loan.[4] At the pre-petition foreclosure sale, a subsidiary of the Creditor bought the property for $1,220,000.[5]  The Debtor filed for bankruptcy on October 4, 2010 under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.[6]  The Creditor filed a proof of claim for $2,855,243.29, alleging that $1,181,513.27 of the claim represents the deficiency from the foreclosure sale.[7]  The Debtor disputed the Creditor’s deficiency claim and argued that the Creditor was over secured by $1,100,000 because the property was worth $3,300,000.[8]

Second Circuit Expands Settlement Payment Defenses

By: Tianja Samuel

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff 

In In re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp.,[1] the Second Circuit greatly expanded the settlement payment defenses of section 546(e) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”)[2] by rejecting Enron’s attempt to avoid a repayment of debt, because the repayment was structured as a redemption.  This case stemmed from a series of transactions in which Enron used a clearing agency—that merely acted as an intermediary and never took title to the commercial paper—to retire commercial paper before the maturity date. Enron later filed bankruptcy and sought to avoid the more than $1.1 billion it paid, in the 90 days prior to its bankruptcy filing, to retire the commercial paper.[3] 

All Tolled Section 108(c) Preserves a Mortgagees Option to Commence a Foreclosure Until After the Automatic Stay is Lifted

By: Matthew W. Silverman

St. John’s Law Student

American Bankruptcy Institute Law Review Staff

In Shamus Holdings, LLC v. LBM Financial, LLC (In re Shamus Holdings, LLC),[1] the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that the tolling provisions of section 108(c)[2] of the Bankruptcy Code preserved a mortgagee’s right to enforce an obsolete mortgage despite failing to seek an extension available under Massachusetts state law.[3] The Massachusetts statute required holders of a mortgage, on pain of forfeiture, to take action against the mortgagor within five years after the end of the mortgage’s stated term, but granted mortgagees the right to seek an extension of that five-year period.[4] Prior to the expiration of the five-year deadline, Shamus filed a chapter 11 petition.[5] After the five year statute of limitations had expired and without having sought an extension of that period, LBM Financial, the mortgagee, took action to enforce its mortgage, relying on the tolling provisions of section 108(c) to preserve its foreclosure rights. Shamus argued that LBM Financial’s failure to seek an extension rendered the mortgage time-barred,[6] but the First Circuit found LBM Financial’s right to enforce its mortgage protected by the tolling provision of section 108(c).[7]